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Introduction
In this chapter I focus on a specific moment in the Italian procedure for 
granting international protection, the first level of appeal. In Italy, asy-
lum seekers should apply for protection upon their arrival in the country, 
filling in a form (Modulo C/3) at a police headquarters. They are usu-
ally hosted in different types of centres while they wait for their hearing 
in front of a Territorial Commission (TC), the administrative board in 
charge of the first evaluation of asylum applications. If they get a negative 
decision, or a lesser protection than the one expected, they can appeal in 
front of one civil tribunal out of the 26 presently competent on asylum 
and, in case of a second negative or unsatisfactory decision, they have a 
right to a second-level appeal at a Court of Appeal. In particular, I use 
the much discussed ‘credibility issue’ as a lens through which to observe 
how this notion is conceived of and employed by appeal judges in two 
different sites. I also show how this approach can help us understand the 
nature of this ‘quasi-legal category’ (Sweeney 2009) as a flexible device 
which is, at the same time, a core issue in the refugee status determination 
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procedure,1 a sensitive category to handle with care,2 and an almost-empty 
shell that can be used for various purposes, stretching out far beyond the 
tribunals themselves. Such purposes can only be grasped when shifting 
the gaze from the mechanics of civil law as enacted inside specific local 
sites, towards national and supra-national migratory policies rooted in an 
entangling culture of indifference (Gill 2016). In their introduction to this 
volume, Gill and Good argue that the current attempt to consolidate a 
“Common European Asylum System” coincides with an unprecedented 
pressure on that same system, due to a drastic increase in the number of 
asylum seekers mostly fleeing from the war in the Middle East. They con-
clude by stressing how the ‘harmonisation’ of the European asylum system 
is still far from sight (see also European Commission 2016).
Against this context, to take a closer look at the way in which the asy-
lum appeal procedure actually works in Italy is quite important, for three 
reasons. Firstly, because Italy is in the spot-light of European and interna-
tional bodies governing migrations, being along with Greece (Cabot 2014), 
both a strategic check-point to guard the external frontiers of Europe, and 
one of the main doors for migrants to enter Europe. Secondly, because of 
some specificities of its asylum system—with two degrees of appeal on the 
merits (plus the possibility to challenge the legality of the decision before 
the Supreme Court), and with appeals being heard by civil courts instead 
of administrative ones.3 And finally, because it reveals an interestingly high 
degree of opacity, instability and variations of both decisional practices and 
underlying norms and assumptions, in a context which is as much vocifer-
ously discussed by the media as it is closed to the public and difficult to 
access for research purposes.
This chapter does not aim to be ‘context-free’, as in Bruno Latour’s 
extremely engaging work on the making of law; on the contrary, and instead 
of trying ‘to capture […] the essence of law ’ (2010: x), I rather focus in detail 
on the civil tribunal of Bologna where I conducted research in 2013–2015, 
and relate it to that of Turin where I interviewed some magistrates in 2016. 
Despite Turin and Bologna being located some 300-kilometers apart, as the 
main towns of separate regions, the two were connected in relation to asy-
lum: the Bologna TC was, at the time of my research, a subsection of the 
3As I write, a highly contested reform is being discussed (D.L 13–17), whereby the procedure is 
reduced from three to two levels of decision: i.e. TC and first Tribunal appeal only.
1See Coffey (2003), Byrne (2007).
2As the many Manuals recently published under the CREDO project show: IARLJ (2013), UNHCR 
(2013), CREDO (2015).
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Turin one.4 My empirical data are drawn from participant observation of a 
tribunal determination, interviews with magistrates and lawyers, and a col-
lective analysis of over 200 appeal decisions. By choosing to remain close 
to the local level, making space for ethnographic details, I do not intend to 
give up the possibility of showing the complex relations that tie specific legal 
procedures to a global understanding and (attempts at) governing asylum 
rights. On the contrary, I try to show how local practices would otherwise 
remain rather obscure if not related to the national and supra-national ideo-
logical and political frames that, paraphrasing Antonio Gramsci, De Genova 
has recently called ‘the “European” Question’ (2016).5 Conversely, by focus-
ing on specific sites at different times, we can see how the repeated use of 
the notion of “refugee crisis” in Europe, and the ‘politics of austerity, acutely 
affecting southern European countries in particular, coupled with border 
enforcement strategies that preemptively illegalise mobile people seeking 
asylum’ (Tazzioli and De Genova 2016: 5), strongly impact on local-level 
decisional procedures of recognition or rejection.
A Prequel
In June 2011, the lawyer I had contacted for my research on Refugee Status 
Determination Procedure (RSDP) managed to persuade a judge at the Civil 
Division of the Bologna tribunal to let me participate as observer in a case 
regarding a denied asylum seeker from Pakistan. I had already learned that 
the first instance appeal takes place at the Civil Division of one of the many 
tribunals in the country, where appeals are set up as a camera di consiglio 
(chamber of council) which—as in other legal processes where privacy pro-
tection is privileged over the public nature of the proceedings - is not open 
to the public and, in the case of asylum, has a monocratic composition. 
Thus a magistrate, the claimant, their representing lawyer and a linguistic 
interpreter are the only actors involved.6 I therefore considered myself lucky 
4While in 2010 ten TCs were operating in Italy, their number has presently risen to some 45 TCs, 
each composed of 4 members from the institutions involved (Prefecture, Police, Local authority and 
UNHCR): extended interviews are carried out by only one member, while final decisions are taken 
collectively.
5Or the need to redefine ‘what is Europe’, when the Schengen area of free mobility, at the core of 
European integration itself, seems to have failed.
6Asylum appellants usually cannot afford a lawyer: it is up to them to find those willing to give ‘free’ 
legal aid (patrocinio gratuito ), whereby their fee is actually met by the State at a lower rate. As for the 
interpreter, things differ from one tribunal to another; in Bologna, they had then recourse to resident 
migrants who consented to translate for free or for a minimal reimbursement.
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to be allowed into a usually closed context, although I was not quite sure 
about what to expect. What I definitely did not anticipate, was how quickly 
it all would go.
On the morning of the hearing I met the lawyer at the tribunal, and she 
led me, the appellant and the interpreter to the judge’s office: a small room 
simply furnished with a few shelves containing files and law books, a few 
chairs and a desk. On the walls and on the desk, some Catholic religious 
images and items were displayed. After introducing myself I was accom-
modated in a corner, while the appellant, his interpreter and his lawyer 
found seats at the desk, facing the judge. With both her posture and tone 
of voice, the judge made clear that she did not intend to waste any time, so 
while quickly flipping through the pages of the file she addressed the lawyer 
directly in Italian, questioning the nature of two new documents she found 
in the file. Since the interpreter had started to translate, the judge stopped 
him, explaining he should only translate when told to do so, and asked 
him first to confirm that he was the linguistic interpreter ‘from Pakistani 
language’.
The lawyer explained to the judge that the two new documents were, 
respectively, a medical certificate from the hospital attesting to the inju-
ries suffered by the appellant’s relatives, and the police report following 
the assault on the appellant’s relatives by a group of neighbours.7 She then 
added:
the scope of the appeal is to eliminate any doubt. The TC expressed doubts 
about this case in relation to a lack of documentation concerning medical cer-
tificates and police reports, which we now produce. But the TC did not pro-
vide clear reasons for the final denial: this fact alone is, for many judges, a 
reason to appeal.8
The judge finally told the interpreter to translate what the lawyer had 
affirmed, and to ask if the appellant wished to add anything. He replied with 
a plea; ‘to the Italian government, that I may be allowed to remain in Italy at 
7I knew from the lawyer’s file that behind the assault was an attempt to grab the land of the appellant’s 
patrilineage following the death of his father and brother; yet during the appeal there was no reference 
to those reasons, nor to documented land disputes in rural Pakistan, where the police are often unable 
or unwilling to offer protection to the party harmed, or complicit with the offenders, as Refworld 
Report attested. See: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5072ca722.html.
8The lawyer was referring to the fact that, in denying all three types of protection—refugee status, sub-
sidiary protection, and humanitarian protection (a national protection granted under Legislative Decree 
25 July 1998, no. 286, art. 5 c. 6)—the TC omitted to explain the reasons for each individual denial.
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least until the situation in Pakistan is solved. I am the only one left to sup-
port my large family and if I go back my life is at risk.’ It was at this point 
of a very short hearing that, in a few seconds, everything changed: from the 
tone of voice of the judge and the look in her eyes, to the colour of the 
lawyer’s face. The judge quickly re-read her notes through, asking the inter-
preter to translate sentence by sentence for the appellant to agree and sign 
the minutes. It thus appeared she had annotated ‘economic support’; when 
questioned by the lawyer on this point, she conceded: ‘I may have added 
“economic” to the word “support” myself, but I do not really think this is a 
matter for interpretation, do you?’. She handed over the minutes for signa-
ture, and murmuring the ritual sentence—‘I shall reserve my decision’9—she 
quickly dismissed us all. Being my first time, I did not immediately catch 
why the lawyer was literally trembling with fury, thinking this was due to 
the rapidity of the procedure and the absence of a real interview. But, as she 
explained when she burst out in front of her client, she already knew the 
outcome would be rejection because he had wrongly suggested material dif-
ficulties; ‘and he shouldn’t have! I had explained this very clearly in my office 
only half an hour before. He said he understood! He should not have ever 
mentioned economic reasons. He should have stuck to the truth!’.
What struck me then about what I had witnessed was the apparent ease 
with which a person who is endowed with the authority can decide in such 
a short time (about 20 minutes altogether) on issues relating to the life and 
death of another person. But over time, I came to realise that many more 
things characterised this particular type of legal encounter. For instance, it 
was possible to apprehend there how inaccurate the previous interview in 
front of the TC had been, where no motivation for rejection was offered, 
and a negative decision was based merely on ‘scepticism’ due to a lack of 
appropriate documentation.10 It also revealed that no real second interview 
may take place even though the judge herself had convoked the appellant; 
that complex social and cultural realties are reduced to transparent facts that 
need no further investigation, rather than being recognised truly as ‘matters 
of interpretation’ (Gibb and Good 2013); and that additional documents 
could be totally neglected, despite the whole appeal revolving around them. 
Finally, it showed how—vis-à-vis a very poor knowledge of the appellant’s 
country of origin (as signaled by the reference to a ‘Pakistani language’), and 
9With this closure sentence the judge defers the decision to a later moment.
10Notwithstanding the fact that in RSDP ‘the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is 
shared between the applicant and the examiner’ (UNHCR 1979): a principle confirmed in Italy by the 
Supreme Court (Cass. S.U. 17/11/2008, no. 27310).
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no further enquiry into the nature of violence connected to land disputes—
the decision could be based on one single ‘wrong’ word.
At the Tribunal
In 2013, two years after this experience, I was involved in the co- 
coordination of research to be carried out at the Bologna tribunal. The pres-
ident of a newly born association to which I belong11 obtained permission 
to conduct research on the files concerning asylum appeal determinations 
taken by that tribunal. During an introductory meeting, the president of the 
Civil Division—competent, among other issues, on asylum—explained how 
the system worked: the Division received and temporarily stored files about 
single appellants, containing all the documents assembled up to that stage.12 
Those documents were received only as print-outs, so they were extremely 
vulnerable: there was only one copy for each file, and if they migrated to 
the Court of Appeal, they might not come back or might be dismembered. 
All the files that did come back (and those which never migrated) should 
then be sent to the archive, located in a different building. But the files’ 
careers didn’t stop there. Once in the archive, the files underwent a new 
transformation, becoming nearly invisible: they still existed, but could not 
be easily retrieved. This happened (indeed, at that time, across the whole 
country) because asylum cases were not labelled under a single specific code 
but rather drowned in the vast sea of files from the Home Office which, 
as the president stressed, ‘literally encompasses everything’. As the president 
went on with her explanation, another quite peculiar obstacle became clear: 
namely, that our admission to the archive for study purposes would be ‘out 
of the question’, since ‘the archivist in charge doesn’t tolerate any other pres-
ence there, besides herself and a few clerks’.13
11Founded in 2013, Asilo in Europa brings together experts on asylum issues from different countries, 
in order to create a network to share knowledge and praxis, and to offer comparative and updated infor-
mation of different types across Europe.
12These comprised: the first request-form filled at a police headquarter (C3); the transcript of the TC’s 
extended interview; its final decision; its notification to the claimant; any documentation provided by 
the claimant at the first hearing; the appeal motivation from the assisting lawyer; any documentation 
added at the appeal stage; transcript of the eventual appeal hearing; the judge’s decision; its notification 
to the appellant.
13Meeting at the Bologna tribunal, 15th of March 2013. On archival relevance for anthropological 
studies and the materiality of paper documents also in asylum, see Basu and De Jong (2016), Cabot 
(2012), Hull (2012), Latour (2010), Sorgoni and Viazzo (2010), Stoler (2009).
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In sum, if we add together the fact that asylum files exist only as one-
copy print-outs, that they might migrate and get lost or damaged on the 
way, and that they were not catalogued as a homogeneous category, we easily 
understand the recent admission of Prefect Trovato at his hearing in front 
of a Parliamentary commission monitoring the influx of migrants. ‘We 
possess total national data on the number of accepted or rejected appeal 
claims’, he explained, adding that in order to get separated statistics on 
single  judiciary bodies, ‘we should go and look from tribunal to tribunal’ 
(Parliamentary Hearing 2015: 13, my translation). This admission renders 
Asilo in Europa’s research (2015) extremely valuable, being so far the only 
existing quali-quantitative study of first instance asylum appeals (in a specific 
tribunal) in Italy.
Over a period of about a year, members of the association studied and 
classified some 233 appeal files relating to decisions from 2011 to 2013. On 
the one hand this time span was compulsory, since only recent files were 
still temporarily stored inside the tribunal while waiting to be sent to the 
main archive. But on the other hand, the period proved strategic, giving us 
the additional possibility of verifying whether the unrest in Tunisia, the so 
called ‘Arab spring’, and the Libyan war in 2011–2012—which had resulted 
in a consistent increase in the number of migrants to Italy, and in ad hoc 
reception policies labelled ENA (North African Emergency)—significantly 
impacted on the decisions and, eventually, in what way. I come back to this 
latter issue below; here I want first to give some numerical data about asy-
lum appeals in Bologna, as they emerged from our research.
To classify the files, we selected some relevant criteria: age, sex and coun-
try of origin of the appellant; length of the entire determination procedure; 
if appealing from an open centre or a CIE (Centre for Identification and 
Expulsion, i.e., administrative detention); if falling under the ENA label; the 
percentage of procedurally-based decisions vis-à-vis decisions on the merits; 
and the completeness of the file. About the latter point, it is important to 
note that out of 233 files, only 22 were complete in the sense defined ear-
lier (see Footnote 12). Also, out of 233 files, 21 contained no trace of any 
decision while in 41 cases the decision was founded solely on procedural 
grounds, which left us with 171 files to analyse thoroughly. Out of 171 files, 
110 (64%) ended with a rejection of the appeal, while in 61 cases (36%) the 
judge decided to allow the appeal: in these cases, only one person obtained 
refugee status, with 22 obtaining subsidiary protection, and 38 (over 62%) a 
one-year humanitarian protection.
Turning now to the so-called ENA, and in order to understand its impact 
on appeal decisions in Bologna, we need to switch momentarily from the 
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determination procedure to the reception system, since what made that phe-
nomenon a publicly recognised political débâcle was not only the substantial 
increase in the number of migrants (from less than 5000 in 2010, to over 
62,000 in 2011), but also the Government decision to assign their recep-
tion to the Civil Protection Corps, usually in charge of natural disasters.14 
A new and temporary reception system was thus abruptly set in place with 
full power, running parallel to (and at times conflicting with) the already 
existing and tested one. To cut a long and disastrous story short,15 it is 
important to know that the logic behind the reception of those migrants 
consisted mainly in separating Tunisians from ‘Libyans’, both in spatial 
and procedural terms. The former were initially given six-months leave and 
de facto allowed to cross the national border (mostly to France), and later 
forcibly repatriated according to the Italy-Tunisia Treaty hastily signed in 
March 2011; the latter were distributed across the country in new ‘ENA 
centres’ where they were to wait until their claim for protection was pro-
cessed (which turned out to take about two years). This second group was 
almost entirely composed of sub-Saharan Africans who had been living 
and working—many already for years—in Libya when the war started, and 
who fled the country across the Mediterranean. Thus, many of those who 
applied in the first year received a denial, usually on the grounds that they 
could safely ‘go back’ to their respective ‘real’ countries of origin. In fact in 
2011, over 76% of asylum applications (out of 37,350 total applications) 
concerned persons from Africa—mostly from Nigeria, Ghana, Mali (coming 
from Libya), and Tunisia. At the end of that year, 65% of Nigerians, 76% of 
Ghanaians and 82% of Malians respectively, were denied any type of protec-
tion (Ministero dell’Interno 2016b).
What the Italian Government had not anticipated was the clogging of both 
the TCs—which collapsed under the pressure of such high numbers—and 
the tribunals, which started to receive appeals from those denied. This further 
resulted in an unforeseen extension of the declared ‘state of emergency’, and 
consequently of the life (and costs) of the new and supposedly temporary ENA 
hosting centres. After almost two years, the Home Office issued a circular16 
suggesting the TCs granted humanitarian protection to all those known as 
14For detailed descriptions and critical assessments of the ENA process see Marchetti (2012), Bracci 
(2012), Olivieri (2011) on local and national aspects respectively.
15During a public conference (Bologna, 12 April 2013) on the Civil Protection management, Prefect 
Compagnucci acknowledged that ‘in the sacred chambers of power we soon realised this had been a 
mistake, yet we did not change it. This resulted in far too lengthy procedures at an enormous cost’.
16Home Office, Circular no. 400/C/2012, 31 October 2012, Overcoming North African Emergency.
11 What Do We Talk About When We Talk …     229
‘ENA asylum-seekers’, a solution which eventually afforded the opportunity to 
put a political end to the emergency itself, and finally close the centres.
The present relevance of this story is that it also impacted directly on 
the tribunal’s decisions. As shown above, before the 2012 government dis-
position, TCs all over Italy tended to deny any protection to sub-Saharan 
Africans fleeing the war in Libya, on the ground that they could go back 
to their ‘country of origin’; many of them appealed against the denial. A 
founding principle of democracy, the separation of powers is particularly rel-
evant in human rights issues, and a fundamental principle according to EU 
law.17 As Sicakkan (2008: 218) proved in his research on asylum systems in 
17 European countries, ‘institutional decision-making frames where central 
authorities act as the first instance and legal courts as appeal instance’ are 
associated with procedures which are fairer with regard to applicants’ rights. 
Thus, in the ENA situation, the fact that the decisions’ outcome at first 
(state) instance switched from flat denial to humanitarian protection after 
the 2012 ministerial circular, may come as no surprise.18 But in a ‘separate 
system’, appeal courts are then expected to decide in relation to individ-
ual cases independently from the administrative instance’s previous deci-
sion. Indeed, the main purpose of a tribunal system is to allow individuals 
to appeal to an independent judicial body against a negative decision from 
the government. It should therefore be a surprise that, among the 37 appeal 
files that we analysed relating to men from Ghana fleeing from Libya, those 
seven who appealed before the 2012 government circular were all rejected, 
while 26 out of the 30 who appealed after the circular had the first negative 
decision turned into humanitarian protection.
This example seems to point to the fact that the separation of the admin-
istration and the judiciary, while existing in theory, may blur in the actual 
making of the law, especially under certain circumstances. In this specific 
event, we may reasonably think that such circumstances had mostly to do 
with the sudden and unexpectedly high increase in the number of asylum 
claimants in the space of a few months. While this is partly the case, in 
the last section I argue that there are more reasons of a diversified political 
and cultural nature behind all this. Or, to phrase it differently, the contin-
ual resort to notions such as “refugee crisis” or “migrants emergency” is pro-
ductive of specific policies, whereby human rights, embedded in a unique 
17Art. 47 Treaty of Nice.
18Indeed in 2012, when the Home Office inverted its policy, 80% of Nigerians and 89% of Ghanaians 
received Humanitarian Protection, while 78% of Malians got subsidiary protection (Ministero dell’In-
terno 2016b).
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relationship between an individual claim and a specific hosting State, are 
instead managed as political issues of border control between States, medi-
ated by EU and international agreements (Hansen and Stepputat 2005; 
Sorgoni 2011, see also Gill and Good’s Introduction to this volume). The 
ENA situation also uncovers a mechanism based on collective decisions 
rather than on the careful evaluation of individual stories, which translates 
into similar stories resulting in divergent outcomes. For instance, in seven 
cases the judge accorded humanitarian protection on the ground that ‘the 
appellant can be included among those addressed by the 30.10.2012 circular’ 
(Asilo in Europa 2015: 12, my translation) independently from their per-
sonal story, while in 16 decisions the reason for allowing the appeal referred 
to ‘a dignified affective and working life in Libya’ which had been destroyed 
by war (ibid.). No mention was made about Ghana as a safe country of ori-
gin where the appellant could ‘go back’, or that the appellant had first left 
for ‘mere personal and economic reasons’, as stated instead in all the negative 
decisions issued before the 2012 circular. Again, rather than an example of 
arbitrary interpretation of human rights laws, this shows asylum as governed 
by more or less visible migratory politics of containment and control.
So, What Does Credibility Mean?
Credibility in refugee law has been a matter of concern at least since the first 
steps towards the formulation of a common asylum policy in the late nine-
ties. UNHCR (1998) stressed the importance of oral testimony as evidence, 
especially when, as is often the case with asylum, claimants do not possess 
other types of material evidence attesting to their identity and their story of 
persecution. Given precisely this peculiarity of international protection law, 
an evaluation of the credibility of claimants’ narratives has always been an 
issue (Coffey 2003). The subsequent Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) 
consequently allows decision makers to evaluate the coherence and plausibil-
ity of the asylum seekers’ oral testimony, and their general credibility, when 
other material evidence is unavailable19 (see Craig and Zwaan, this volume, 
for an introduction to this Directive).
But the credibility issue in asylum hearings has become the object of 
intense scrutiny in recent times—as the CREDO project and its publications 
19The Directive 2011/95/EU (transposed in Italy in January 2014) replaced the 2004 QD introducing 
no amendments on this point.
11 What Do We Talk About When We Talk …     231
testify—with the specific aim of setting judicial criteria and standards. All 
these Manuals highlight how the effort is particularly needed in the face of ‘the 
unique nature of decision-making in this arcane and highly specialised area of 
law’ (IARLJ 2013: 11), where a core legal category in the common European 
procedure is also one which is ‘understood differently across national asylum 
systems’ (CREDO 2015), partly because the word itself is used with different 
meanings in each national language. In a somewhat circular logic, the effect 
(heterogeneity being the necessary outcome of the decision to employ a notion 
which is historical and contextual, relating as it does to philosophical and cul-
tural understandings of concepts like truth, reality, and person) is turned into 
a cause (different national understandings of credibility introduce arbitrariness 
and dis-homogeneity in an otherwise common system), therefore the notion 
needs to be standardised. Recent attempts to define it more clearly, intend 
to try and reduce such ambiguities: ‘What is needed therefore, in linguistic 
terms, is “contextual disambiguation” to ensure the concept of “credibility” is 
used correctly’ (IARLJ 2013: 12). This, it is proposed, may be obtained by 
avoiding ‘loose’ definitions of the term (‘the credibility of everything related 
to the claim’), concentrating rather on the ‘claimant’s past and present factual 
background’ (ibid., my emphasis). The material facts in the claimant’s story 
must be found internally and externally consistent (i.e., assessing discrepan-
cies within the evidence presented by the claimant, or with evidence provided 
by experts or Country of Origin Information [COI] Reports). The decision- 
maker should take into consideration the totality of the findings of fact (and 
not found the decision on single or marginal ones); any type of evidence 
produced should be carefully weighted (including documentary evidence 
acquired by the decision-maker); and relevant COI should be obtained and 
evaluated.
It seems that the above attempt at disambiguation consists mainly in 
narrowing the meaning of the notion, while at the same time limiting its 
weight: credibility is therefore explicitly linked to the facts narrated rather 
than to the individual per se; and it should be measured in relation to both 
the totality of the facts, and also other types of evidence (both material and 
non-material). By stressing the need to reduce the relative weight of ‘credi-
bility’ in RSDP, such recent efforts also indirectly signal the increased impor-
tance the notion had gained, vis-à-vis other types of evidence (Sorgoni, 
under review). The research at the Bologna tribunal confirmed the central 
role played by credibility: in 171 files, 76 (44%) were rejected because—
among other things—either the applicant or the story were declared ‘not 
credible’ (and also ‘not plausible’, or ‘inconsistent’); in 11 cases (14%) the 
lack of credibility figured as the only ground for rejection, often without 
232     B. Sorgoni
any further explanation (Asilo in Europa 2015). In a national legal context 
in which the adherence to a common system was at the time still young 
(Cherubini 2015), the European directives only just transposed, and a COI 
system—which could counter-balance decisions based solely on the narra-
tive’s evaluation—virtually non-existent, the use of the credibility notion in 
those years was so pervasive that the category came to mean anything, and 
nothing.
Again, the case of a man from Pakistan of Shiite orientation living in a 
Sunni majority area can help illustrate this. The TC had already denied him 
the right to any protection on the ground that the facts narrated appeared 
‘poorly credible’ because, after having been abducted and tortured by a 
group of Sunnis, he did not report to the police; his story was ‘contradic-
tory’ since he had mentioned the need to support his family; and he him-
self appeared not credible because he was not able to state the consequences 
he would face if returned, having merely declared: ‘I don’t know what could 
happen to me’.20 Five months later, at the appeal, he produced a medi-
cal certificate attesting to the injuries suffered by his son during a similar 
assault, and the related report to the local police. While no mention of this 
documentation was made by the judge, he likewise found the appellant not 
credible, mainly because he presented no proof of his Shiite faith, nor any 
information ‘about his sustenance while in Italy’.21 When weighted against 
the suggestions put forward by the above Manuals, the application of the 
credibility notion in this decision is definitely very loose, based as it is on 
marginal or totally irrelevant facts, without the acquisition on the part of the 
judge of documentary evidence or COI, and with the dismissal of primary 
documents produced by the appellant.
But credibility can reach a ‘ground zero’ level, when it is reduced to an 
empty wrapper. This is the case of a young woman and single mother from 
Senegal who was denied international protection without having been inter-
viewed: since she could not attend the first screening, the TC assumed she 
was not genuinely motivated. During the appeal hearing, she explained to 
the judge that she had obtained an official remittal of the first screening, but 
had missed its re-scheduling because they had changed the location. Despite 
the fact that no other question was raised, in the eyes of the judge the 
20The TC interpreted the sentence literally, suggesting that if the applicant didn’t even know what he 
risked, there was clearly no real danger in going back. It goes without saying that a non-literal transla-
tion could convey a totally different meaning, as in the semantic form of preterition.
21Notwithstanding the fact that the ‘sustenance’ issue has some relevance for economic migrations, but 
has none in relation to RSDP.
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appellant’s behaviour undermined her credibility since she failed to attend 
the interviews ‘without adducing any justification’ and she ‘reported nothing 
in relation to her way of sustenance in Italy’ so that ‘in sum, her whole story 
appears inconsistent, vague, without any possible ascertainment’. The prob-
lem, in this case, lies in the fact that there was no story to evaluate, neither 
at the first hearing (which never took place), nor at the appeal stage where 
only irrelevant or inappropriate questions were asked.
A loose evaluation of credibility can also take other forms, as in the case 
of a young man from Iraq. His story was in principle sadly simple: it could 
have been easily classified as an ‘instrumental later claim’ to avoid depor-
tation, from an ‘illegal migrant’ who had been working irregularly in Italy 
for over 9 years. When his irregular position was accidentally detected by 
the police, he was taken to a CIE with a repatriation order, and applied for 
asylum. He was interviewed by the TC a month later and, upon denial, he 
appealed: despite the hearing being scheduled only two months later, this 
was a non-suspensive appeal which never took place, since he had been 
deported. If the preceding story was a zero-level credibility instance—the 
non-credibility of the story grounded on an absent story—in this case we 
find an apparently unreasonable excess in the recourse to the credibility 
notion. In face of a lack of valid residence permits and a regular job, an asy-
lum claim put forward to avoid deportation is considered, by definition, not 
genuine and leads to rejection. So why did the TC feel the need to refer 
to the (non)credibility of the story in order to justify its negative decision? 
Indeed, by merely evaluating the testimony’s credibility, the TC should come 
to an opposite decision. For what is incoherent about an illiterate Iraqi Kurd 
raised by his mother in Syria until her premature death, who then worked 
in Libya before moving to Italy? And why is it implausible that he could not 
name current political parties, the outcome of the last elections, and a very 
famous museum, all in relation to a country he fled under the bombs, at the 
age of 6?
Beyond Credibility
The research I have presented shows a very loose and unmotivated, excessive 
recourse to the notion of credibility to ground negative determinations, so 
that to a certain extent a better knowledge and a more careful employment 
of the suggestions put forward by the many existing manuals on asylum 
determination, could have limited the sense of arbitrary unfairness one gets 
from reading those files.
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Yet, I am not sure that, by switching from the credibility of the applicant 
to that of the application—the credibility of the person vs that of the account 
(CREDO 2015)—the (inherent) ambiguity of the notion vanishes. What 
appears in the CREDO manuals as a move towards maximising objectivity, 
in fact obscures other aspects that cannot be neglected. One is the decision- 
makers’ own subjectivity, the processes at work in their minds in the specific 
setting of asylum hearings (Johnson 2013), as well as their ‘personal theories 
of “truth” and “risk”’, which those recent manuals acknowledge (suggesting 
they should be minimised, while leaving aside how and if this is altogether 
possible); another is the ‘need to understand subtle cultural, gender, demean-
our and linguistic issues’ (IARLJ 2013: 19), a task that cannot be improvised 
and proves extremely difficult to address; and finally the inter-subjective 
nature of the claimants’ narrative, produced with the active participation of 
many subjects beside the claimant him/herself, through an elaborate en-tex-
tualisation process (see Spotti, Gibb, this volume) which ex post attributes to 
asylum seekers, as ‘their own words’, what is in fact a stratified texture woven 
by many hands at various stages of a long procedure, in different institutional 
settings (see Danstrøm and Whyte, this volume).22 Therefore, while a loose 
use of the notion could and should be avoided, I believe that a residual and 
irreducible trace of ambiguity will necessarily remain.
But my intention here is not to offer ad hoc solutions to make the exist-
ing asylum system fairer to those ‘happy few’ who land alive at the exter-
nal frontiers of Europe, thus supporting the positivist illusion that finding 
yet more technicalities, or refining existing ones, will eventually render the 
screening of human beings ‘objective’.23 While acknowledging that legal 
processes are (necessarily?) intrinsically positivist, this recognition does not 
render the procedure ‘objective’: rejected claimants may not be ‘objectively 
undeserving’, but appear to be so after having been processed by a long, 
non-homogeneous and fragmented procedure. A procedure in which hidden 
cultural assumptions ‘typically permeate the mind-set of lawyers’ and judges 
(Grillo 2016; Ballard 2010), and which is embedded in (macro)political 
orientations. A fair recognition of the aspiration of a multitude to a digni-
22These aspects have long been addressed in anthropological critique of the asylum system; see among 
others: Blommaert (2001, 2009), Good (2007), Gibb and Good (2014), Jacquemet (2005), Maryns 
(2006), Cabot (2011) on Greece, Sbriccoli and Jacoviello (2011), Sorgoni (2013) on Italy.
23See Campbell (2013) on supposedly objective technicalities in UK; Fassin and Kobelinsky (2012) on 
deontological ethics of appeal judges in France. On a personal level, the general system presupposes a 
belief in the right to select between ‘the drowned and the saved’ (Levi 1986): a moral position I do not 
wish to embrace.
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fied and safe life does not depend on correcting some faults in the asylum 
system, as if the system itself existed in a vacuum, independent and detached 
from those global migratory politics and rhetorics in which, on the contrary, 
it is radically embedded. Such politics and rhetorics magnify the commit-
ment to homogeneous and objective determinations, while obfuscating how 
a few fair decisions are predicated upon the potentially extremely unfair 
rejection and exclusion of the majority, and their confinement in the global 
south, or in some new no man’s land as the hotspots in Greece and Italy, 
where most migrants are summarily labelled as ‘economic migrants’, i.e. ille-
gal migrants with no right to even begin to access the asylum procedure.24
In the same vein, the findings discussed here are not intended as a way to 
judge the judges: while we can acknowledge the many failings of the deter-
mination system as practiced at the tribunal in 2011 in Bologna,25 it would 
be unfair and definitely myopic to stop there. Those faults had various 
causes: the absence of a proper COI system which could provide updated 
information on the socio-political situation of the area of origin; the work-
load of judges not specifically nor solely dedicated to asylum issues; their 
reduced number vis-à-vis that of appeals; their (often) poor preparation in 
international protection and EU law; and their poor familiarity with playing 
an active role and sharing the burden of the proof.26 But we should look also 
beyond the tribunal’s rooms, the imperfections of the system, or the credibil-
ity issue itself.
And if we look at asylum recognition rates in Italy from 2008 to 2015, 
we discover that denials peaked twice: in 2011 and 2015 (Anci et al. 2016: 
103). The first is the period addressed with the former research in Bologna, 
the second coincides with my current research in Turin. There are significant 
differences between the two contexts: in Turin judges now share a database 
on determinations, classified by country and type, that allows them to com-
pare similar cases to avoid divergent outcomes; they circulate information 
from reliable and updated COI websites; an interpreter is present and paid 
by the tribunal. They are also aware of the traps of the credibility notion 
especially for ‘civil law judges, who are more familiar with documents than 
24As a response to the “refugee crisis”, the European Agenda on Migration adopted on 31st May 2015 
(European Commission 2015) introduced new border points in Greece and Italy, denominated hot-
spots, where Europol, Easo and Frontex officials support national ones to ensure quicker identification 
and fingerprinting procedures. So far, this is probably the most disputed issue of the Agenda (Amnesty 
International 2016).
25Asilo in Europa Report (2015) offers some recommendations in that sense.
26A magistrate to the author, Turin, November 2016.
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with life stories’.27 Most of all, they are acutely critical about their insuffi-
cient numbers and ‘the loneliness of the asylum judge’, especially since asy-
lum is but one among their many duties. And they relate to their insufficient 
number the fact that ‘now we don’t interview [the appellants] any more’.28
In 2011, for the first time, the European myth of safe external borders 
crashed; again in 2015 all the securitisation measures adopted proved use-
less in face of the Syrian civil war. In both cases the EU, or single European 
states, reacted by signing ‘treaties’ with non-European states in order to 
block the migrants before they even reached its external borders, while the 
rhetoric of the ‘refugee crises’ became a media and political leitmotiv and the 
term ‘crisis’ itself self-explanatory (Roitman 2014; De Genova and Tazzioli 
2016; Knight and Stewart 2016). At a national level, on both occasions gov-
ernmental circulars pushed for either collective decisions (as with ENA in 
2012), or cursory ones (as with the 19.6.2015 circular pretending each TC 
evaluate at least 16 claims per day29), justifying such extraordinary meas-
ures with reference to the sudden increase of migrants. And yet in 2015, 
154,000 migrants entered Italy (while in 2014 there were 170,000), out of 
which 84,000 applied for asylum (as opposed to 60,000 in 2014). Rather 
than supporting the fabricated sense of invasion, the numbers expose a long 
lasting political choice and self-representation of Italy as a transit country, 
an accidental destination to be dealt with through laisser-passer formal and 
informal policies (Ciabarri 2016; Kersh and Mishtal 2016; Tuckett 2015, 
2016) that periodically reiterate the ‘migrants emergency’ issue as a sud-
den and unexpected event that threatens national cultural and religious 
identity (Giordano 2014). This is a ‘politics of scarcity’ (Vacchiano 2011: 
194) where the collapse of the system is not due to an excess of migrants, 
but to a deliberate adoption of ever-temporary measures, and a systematic 
avoidance of adopting serious policies of recognition, reception and inclu-
sion. Such policies would include, among other things, a strengthening of 
the national asylum system, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. In 
the absence of this, the different responses at Bologna and Turin are but two 
sides of the same coin, and a fairer asylum system—albeit morally due—is 
but a band-aid solution fed by the same ‘culture of denial’ (Souter 2011), 
and the same self-fulfilling prophecy that ‘they’ are not here to stay. The day 
after the release of an official EC video on the effective sealing of borders,30 a 
27A magistrate to the author, Turin, December 2016.
28Ibid.
29Such circulars are not public but this one was mentioned in an official publication: (Ministero dell’In-
terno 2016a: 34).
302016: the year the EU took robust action to control migration flows https://youtu.be/
EYO0z2Tnr2A?list=PLXPWZG37uPbOH-i8kqpPoxGzLLDt9i1Sd [14 December 2016].
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judge commented: ‘why don’t they simply say that we cannot afford to pro-
tect human rights, so that we just quit?’.
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